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What do Ovid, Dante, Petrarch, Camões, Cervantes, Shakespeare, 
Caravaggio, Velázquez, Rembrandt, Bach, Goya, Mozart, Beethoven, 
Turner, Hugo, Tolstoy, Eliot, Pessoa, among others, have in com-
mon? One answer is simple: they all have been the creators of great 
works of art. But what makes something a work of art? What is art? 
Here the puzzles begin and the philosophy of art attempts to answer 
these and related questions. The meta-philosophy of art seeks to pro-
vide a framework in which these questions can be addressed.
In Art and Art-Attempts, Christy Mag Uidhir aims at providing such 
framework. He begins with the assumption that art is “intention-
dependent” and he investigates “what follows from taking intention-
dependence seriously as a substantive necessary condition for being 
art” (p. 6). This he calls the ‘Attempt Theory of Art’. As he warns 
the reader, the Attempt Theory of Art “is not itself a theory of art” 
(p. 6), but what we might call a meta-theory: it focuses on what a 
theory of art must be, minimally, to be viable as such. The purpose is 
not to enquire into the nature of art, but to provide “something even 
better: a unified, systematic, and productive framework for philo-
sophical enquiry into art” (p. 209).
The first chapter is crucial and it deals with “art and failed art”. 
Mag Uidhir never spells out the conditions for something being art 
(he begins by professing ignorance about this) but he claims that “the 
way in which [a] thing comes to satisfy the conditions for being art 
(whatever those may be) must be the product of intentional action” 
(p. 23). (He purports to begin with an assumption that is uncon-
troversial.) Here he gives an example that shows that his Attempt 
Theory, rather than being unanimously accepted as he claims, is 
quite controversial. He asks us to imagine that he attempts to paint 
a realist portrait of his aunt Teresa. Since he is an “inept painter” 
and the result does not resemble his aunt “in the slightest”, he fails 
to produce a portrait of his aunt Teresa. With this everyone agrees. 
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“However, the irregularly shaped blob possesses rather striking aes-
thetic properties, though only as an accidental (and unbeknownst to 
me) result of actions intended to be in service to the portraiture” (p. 
34). Mag Uidhir concludes that the result is not a work of art (it is 
failed art) because the aesthetic properties that the work does possess 
are not the result of the intention to produce them: “the work has 
those properties as the result of the way in which my attempt at por-
traiture failed and not as the result of any successful art-attempt” (p. 
34). So, he concludes, even though the work does possess aesthetic 
properties, and appears to be an artwork, it is not one. He says it is 
“complex failed-art” (p. 35) and he adds that “it could be the case 
that many things thought to be art are in fact complex failed-art” (p. 
35). Indeed, if all aspects with aesthetic interest need to be intended 
in order to be artistic, then there are many works that are in fact 
complex failed-art according to Mag Uidhir.
This example is illustrative of the controversial aspect of the At-
tempt Theory, despite Mag Uidhir’s claims that the theory is accept-
able to all. While professing ignorance about the nature of art (p. 1), 
Mag Uidhir claims that it is not sufficient for a work to be art that it 
has aesthetic properties: they need also be the result of intentional 
actions of the appropriate type. So despite his attempt to remain 
neutral with regards to theories of (the nature of) art, Mag Uidhir’s 
tacit theory rejects at least the aesthetic theory of art, a theory which 
could give art status to his failed portrait of aunt Teresa. Moreover, 
it does not seem true that his Attempt Theory applies to all works 
of art, even though it applies to many. For instance, Anne Frank’s 
Diary and Fernão Lopes’s Chronicles were not literature attempts (and 
therefore not art-attempts), but both are now regarded as literature 
and therefore as art. Anne Frank’s Diary was meant to be a journal, 
with no literary pretensions, and Fernão Lopes’s Chronicles were at-
tempts at history, even though they are now studied in Portuguese 
Literature courses and read as literature: their aesthetic (more pre-
cisely, literary) properties have made them gain that art status.
So Mag Uidhir’s “Attempt Theory” and his distinction between 
art and failed art is far from being uncontroversial, and despite the 
author’s claims of independence from any substantive theory of art, 
it relies on a tacit theory of art that is at least a rejection of an aes-
thetic theory of art. In fact, the Attempt Theory which Mag Uidhir 
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puts forward denies artistic status to the aesthetic properties that 
were not intended by the artists. This seems to me a high price to 
pay, since it is certain that artists are not aware of or responsible 
for all the aesthetic properties their works end up possessing: many 
aesthetic effects are unconsciously produced and part of the value of 
works of art is due to their amazing and surprising aesthetic results, 
arrived at in a variety of ways, consciously to a great extent but with 
unconscious elements as well. Furthermore, it is not always clear (in 
fact, most of the time it is not clear) which aesthetic features were in-
tended when producing a work of art, so Mag Uidhir’s theory leaves 
us with uncertainty as to what we can interpret as artistic in most 
works of art. In addition, the intentions of the artist are not always 
publicly available. So if Mag Uidhir’s theory is correct we can say 
very little (from an artistic point of view) about most works of art.
The theory that “something is an artwork if and only if that thing 
is the product of a successful art-attempt” (p. 86) is, therefore, far 
from uncontroversial. Moreover, without endorsing a theory of art 
it is hard to see what distinguishes a failed art-attempt from a suc-
cessful art-attempt. Mag Uidhir’s theory requires additional clari-
fication about what makes art count as art. Saying “whatever those 
[conditions] may be” (passim!) is not enough. For instance, we need 
to know what makes Camões’s epic poem a masterpiece. We need a 
principled way of distinguishing between Júlio Dinis’s largely failed 
attempts at poetry and his clearly successful attempts at novel writ-
ing. We need to know what makes Eça de Queirós’s novels so suc-
cessful as literature. (We certainly don’t want to claim that public, 
institutional, success is the only criterion to distinguish good art 
from bad art or failed art).
The controversy of the Attempt Theory does not end here. For 
example, the wish to preserve the Attempt Theory leads Mag Uidhir 
to conclude that “PHOTOGRAPHY cannot be an art form because 
to be a photograph is to be the mere causal product of a certain pho-
tochemical process, and being a mere causal product of photochemi-
cal processes is neither attempt-dependent nor intention-dependent” 
(p. 119). Granted, not all attempts in photography are works of art. 
But neither are all attempts in painting or literature or music always 
successful artistic attempts.
Despite my disagreement, I must say that this book is an inter-
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esting and praiseworthy book. With a variety of examples, most of 
them from contemporary art, Art and Art-Attempts offers thought-
provoking discussion in the meta-philosophy of art. The choices of 
the artistic examples assume, however, a theory of art that is more 
inclusive than some readers would be prepared to endorse. And Mag 
Uidhir does not tell us what are the criteria used to endorse his tacit 
theory of art. So he leaves us with no way of distinguishing art from 
“failed art”. For example, Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, John Cage’s 
4’33’’, Tracey Emin’s My Bed and (pour couronner le tout) Manzoni’s 
The Artist’s Shit are all art-attempts. But what makes them “success-
ful” or “failed”? Is the admission into the circle of art critics sufficient 
for a work to qualify as a successful art-attempt? The problem is that 
Mag Uidir’s account does not provide a way to decide on this cru-
cial matter, leaving us with no distinction between works of art and 
failed works of art. He offers the following:
artworks and failed-artworks are both products of the right sort of 
attempts, the difference being that artworks satisfy the conditions for 
being art (whatever those may be) by virtue of the way in which those at-
tempts succeeded while failed-artworks do not satisfy the conditions 
for being art (and so, are non-art) by virtue of the way those attempts 
failed. (p. 17)
The underlying and professed ignorance on this matter is therefore 
crucial. To give the art examples Mag Uidhir gives, he must endorse 
a theory that allows their inclusion.
We are thus left very curious about what makes some things 
works of art and others just “failed” works of art. This book is very 
thought-provoking and a good contribution to discussion in the phi-
losophy of art. The starting point and main thesis is, however, and 
despite the author’s claims and best intentions, contentious and will 
certainly invite questions and rebuttals.
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